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Abstract 
Mergers and acquisitions is a way for companies to grow, establish and gain entry to new 
markets. They can be categorized as either friendly or hostile. A hostile takeover occurs when 
a company gains control over a targeted company without the consent from either the board of 
directors or the management of the target company. Instead the aim of the acquirer is to 
persuade and charm the shareholders of the targeted company to sell their stock. Since every 
publicly listed company faces the risk of being a target for a hostile takeover, many 
companies protect themselves by implementing various defense measurements and strategies. 
These strategies could be either pro-active, such as the poison pill and staggered board 
defense strategy or re-active, such as the crown jewel and white knight defense strategy. The 
purpose of this thesis is to describe and explain which defense strategies are the most effective 
and easiest to implement when facing a hostile takeover.  
Based on our researches and analyzes, we believe and argue that the most easiest and 
effective way of fending off a hostile bid, is to implement both the poison pill and staggered 
board defense measurements combined. By doing this, the acquirer is not able to gain 
immediate control over the target company and the poison pill defense measurement help 
stagger and make the bid more expensive for the bidder. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Companies worldwide have realized the importance of being present and to be operating 
transnational. That is why many firms tend to expand globally through Mergers & 
Acquisitions. Furthermore a takeover could be categorized as either friendly or hostile, 
whereas the latter one is characterized as an acquisition of control of a target company 
without a contract or a mutual understanding with the management of the target firm (Savela, 
1999). Furthermore, if a bid is placed for the shares of the target company without informing 
its board, the term hostile takeover is also applied (Damodaran, 1997) 
A target company which faces a hostile bid from an acquiring firm does not stand helpless. 
The management of the targeted firm may implement certain defense measures, such as 
various corporate defense strategies, which aims to make the hostile bid less profitable for the 
acquiring firm as well as protecting the shareholders and the management of the targeted firm.  
Commonly known is that there are several reactive measurements that can be implemented in 
the case of a hostile takeover, but one important aspect that we will also look further in to are 
the proactive measures that can be implemented prior to a hostile bid. The commitment to 
defend against future takeover attacks is important both because of preventive defenses take 
time to construct and because they signal that the board and the executives are united in the 
pursuit of the goal of the companies’ independence. 
Furthermore, a company which is publicly listed should never feel totally safe nor out of 
range for possible future hostile takeovers. That is why it has become more common and 
significantly more important for today’s companies to highlight and realize the importance of 
various defense strategies against hostile takeovers as well as being aware of the potential risk 
of being bought by another company. 
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1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate which defense strategies are the most effective and 
easiest to put into practice.  To do so, we want in this thesis give an understanding regarding 
the meaning of hostile takeovers and the reasons behind them and also further investigate the 
different defense strategies available for the targeted firm and what their effects and purposes 
are against the hostile bid. We will try to clarify the use of some of the defense strategies by 
presenting some cases where actual defense measures have been used and look in to what 
happened and what effects they gave. These different aspects we feel are important to high 
light because they may not always be considered when governing a publicly listed company 
and could thereby oppose a threat in the future if neglected. 
 
 
The following crucial questions are necessary to respond to in order to reach the purpose of 
the study: 
 
• What is a hostile takeover? 
• What are the driving forces behind a hostile takeover? 
• Which different hostile takeover defenses are available when facing a hostile takeover 
bid from another company? 
• What effect did the chosen defense strategies have in some specific cases? 
 
 
1.3 Limitations 
 
Since the purpose of our thesis is to investigate which defense strategy is the most preferable 
and easiest to put into practice, we will besides from collecting and analyzing theoretical 
information, also want to mention historical events which we believe is relevant to our thesis. 
In order for us to do so, we have chosen not to limit ourselves to hostile takeovers cases 
within the same region or industry and instead investigate cases of hostile takeovers that are 
transnational and global, penetrating boarders from a country to another. We are limiting 
ourselves to some of the most common and mentioned defense strategies in literature and will 
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not mention the few rare and special strategies that are used occasionally. As we have not 
focused on one specific country or industry, we will not give details on the matter of different 
legal frameworks between countries or industries if it does not affect the choice of defense 
strategy, the bid or the outcome. However, if there are large legal differences regarding some 
of the defense measures this will be brought up in the thesis, but commonly they are very 
similar to the legal frameworks originating from the U.S. 
 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
In this chapter of our thesis, we will give an introduction to, as well as describe the term 
corporate acquisitions. Furthermore, we will develop and explain the three most common 
ways of acquisitions used today. We will continue this chapter by defining and explaining the 
term ‘hostile takeover’ as well as explain and discuss the different defense measurements 
available when facing a hostile bid. They consist of pro-active measurements which are 
implemented before facing a hostile bid and re-active measurements, which are implemented 
after a hostile bid has been offered. 
 
2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
We are speaking about merger and acquisitions of a company, when the controlling position 
of a company is transferred from one shareholder group of interest to another. The bidding 
company is known as the acquiring company and the company which is being targeted for a 
possible merger or acquisition is known as the target company.  
There are three general ways (vertical acquisition, horizontal acquisition and conglomerated 
acquisition) for a company to take control over a company which is publicly listed. First of all 
there is the possibility for a small group, consisting of either board members or external 
investors who find the target company interesting and has the financial recourses, to put a bid 
for the whole company and possibly gaining ownership over the target company’s entire stock 
distribution and their by controlling it. Another way would be if a single shareholder 
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successfully convinced other shareholders to give up their voting rights, in order to gain 
access to the board of decision with a majority of the voting rights. This way of acquiring a 
company is relatively difficult, since one has to argue and give good reasons for shareholders 
of a company to give up their stakes. A third option of gaining control over a target company 
could be through a merger, acquisition of the company’s assets or stocks (Ross, Westerfield & 
Jaffe, 2005). 
There are several reasons why a company would put a bid or acquire another company. The 
main reasons for acquiring another firm is naturally the possibility in improving productivity, 
gaining market shares as well as improving the stability of positive results. Improvement in 
productivity is generally achieved by reorganization and restructuring of the management as 
well as the company structure, while at the same time looking to utilize the company's 
resources in a more efficient and effective way. Furthermore, the acquiring company is 
seeking to take advantage of the potential economic of scale an acquirement often means, as 
well as seeking to reduce and cut expenses related to information and intelligence logistics. If 
the main reason for acquiring another company is to seek productivity improvements, the deal 
could be characterized as a vertical acquisition. If the main reason and motive for acquiring 
another firm is to improve presence as well as gaining market shares, the settlement could be 
characterized as horizontal acquisition. If the company is only seeking to establish more 
sustainable positive results in spreading its risks in many different industries through 
ownership, the acquisition could be called a conglomerated acquisition (Ross et al, 2005). 
2.1.1 Vertical Acquisition 
 
A vertical acquisition takes place when a company gains ownership over a company, 
operating in the same industry as the acquiring company. As we have mentioned before, the 
reasons and motives for the acquiring company could be several, but usually the acquiring 
company chooses to implement a vertical acquisition in order to establish control of the whole 
production chain, thus potentially securing and strengthening its market position. One 
example of vertical acquisition could be when an airline company gains ownership over a 
travel agency. By doing so, the airline company prevents the possibility for the travel agency 
to change airline in the future, as well as improving and developing its marketing strategy, 
which could be for instance marketing of travel and flights to destinations where the airline 
has the most available flights (Weston, Mitchel & Mulherin, 2004). 
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2.1.2 Horizontal Acquisition 
 
A horizontal acquirement involves two companies, operating and competing in the same 
industry. The motives are as usual several, but the most general goal is to seek advantages in 
economics of scale by improving the management and administration of the company as well 
as better take advantage of the unused and available capacity in production. Furthermore, 
horizontal acquisitions have a negative impact on competition, in the sense of increased 
potential monopoly revenues for companies, while firms gradually decrease from the market 
or being bought up. These types of acquisition are relatively common, since a company’s 
growth strategy often include acquiring other companies, operating in the same industry. 
When a company wants to go abroad and establish its presence in a foreign country which it 
has never operated in before, it is generally known that acquiring an already established firm 
with a brand which is already known in the region with already existing product and supply 
chains, is many times a lot easier and more cost efficient than trying to establish one’s 
unknown brand in the region from scratch. After an acquisition, the companies merged 
together, often adopts a brand name in the beginning, including both the previous companies’ 
names, illustrating that an acquisition has been made but also to ensure a feeling of comfort 
for the acquired company’s already existing customers (Weston et al, 2004). 
2.1.3 Conglomerated Acquisition 
 
A conglomerated acquisition occurs when a company gains ownership over another company, 
operating and existing in an entirely different kind of industry. These types of acquisitions are 
often made in the purpose of diversifying one’s risks, and are often performed by companies 
which have their core businesses in a relatively high risk type on industry. The main goal is to 
seek a sustainable platform with interests and operations in different types of industries 
entirely independent of each other, risk diversifying and enabling the possibility of one 
industry which it has interests in to be profitable, while other industries might have a 
downturn, since it is normal for some industries to do better when others are doing worse 
(Weston et al, 2004). 
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2.2 Hostile Takeovers 
 
The term “Hostile Takeover” is defined as when a company puts a bid on a target firm, which 
is being opposed by the management of the targeted company which furthermore advises its 
shareholders not to sell to the acquiring firm (Savela, 1999). Also, if a bid is placed for the 
shares of the target company without informing its board and is directly aimed to the 
shareholders, the term hostile takeover is also applied (Damodaran, 1997). The bid or offer 
could be suggested towards the shareholders with or without the consent or negotiations from 
the management of the targeted firm. Furthermore, there is a thin line between what is 
characterized as a hostile bid or a normal bid, since it sometimes occurs that a friendly or 
normal bid if you, develops into a hostile bid. However, hostile bids and offers are generally 
directly aimed at the shareholders of the targeted company in hope of gaining control over the 
company without the consent from the board of directors of the targeted firm (Statens 
Offentliga Utredningar SOU, 1990). 
The motives behind a hostile takeover in theory, is usually the same as with other 
acquisitions, except one additional reason or motive for a hostile bid. It is said that the most 
effective way of replacing an ineffective board of directors or management of a targeted firm, 
is through a hostile takeover. When a company operates ineffectively even though it has great 
growth potential or the value of the stock price doesn’t properly illustrate the real value of the 
company, the firm is undervalued. The acquiring company then wishes and aims to replace 
the old management, in order for the company to achieve its full revenue and growth 
potential, thus increasing its stock value. For this reason, companies with a management that 
doesn’t seek the best interests for its shareholders are often potential objects for future 
acquirements.  
A company could during a short period of time have a management that is ineffective, but in 
theory, if the market has its way, they will eventually in the long run be replaced. As we have 
mentioned before, this could be due to the lack of economic growth potential the management 
has been able to realize or perhaps that the strategic plan of the board does not comply with 
the shareholders view or expectations (J.M Samuels, et al, 1999). 
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A hostile takeover could therefore sometimes also be seen as an effective market transaction, 
which simply replaces a bad management, in order to gain increased company value for the 
acquiring company as well as for the shareholders of the targeted firm (Weston et al, 2004). 
 
2.2.1 Are Takeovers Positive or Negative? 
 
The opinions are many in this question and a lot of research has been undertaken. It is still 
hard to say whether takeovers are beneficial on the balance and the only thing that is certain is 
that the beneficial or negative affects depend highly on from whose angle one is viewing 
from.   
There is still an unresolved issue in empirical research about corporate control in whether a 
take-over actually improves the value of the bidder and the target firm. However, what studies 
have been able to show, is that all the gains or positive effects tend to go to the shareholders 
of the target firm and that the acquiring firm pays a premium for their company. Furthermore, 
hostile takeovers in most cases improve the value for the shareholders of the targeted firm, 
thus the term hostile is being used to illustrate the opposition faced by the target firm’s board 
of directors and not necessarily the shareholders´. A takeover which takes the shareholders of 
the target firm in consideration first, in other words maximizing shareholder value, is called 
positive (Weston et al, 2004). 
 
2.2.2 Bid Premium 
 
For a hostile bid to take place, an offer has to be made to the shareholders of the target firm. 
This bid is very often a lot higher than what the target firm is valued on the market, in order to 
receive a positive response from the shareholders and the board of directors of the target firm. 
The difference between the bid and what the target company is actually worth is called bid 
premium. The size of the bid premium depends on the acquiring company’s willingness to 
pay for the target company and according to surveys done in the UK, average bid premiums 
of hostile takeovers in UK are between 35-45 per cent higher than the market price of the 
target company (Schoenberg, 2003). 
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Defense strategies issued by the targeted company have different purposes. While some 
strategies are formulated specifically to prevent the bidder from gaining ownership over the 
company’s equities or stocks, other help stagger the bid and even increase it, thus resulting in 
a higher bid premium received by the target firm.  
2.3 Defense Strategies 
 
All bids that are made between companies are, as mentioned earlier, not always welcomed 
with open arms from the target company’s board of directors. In that case the bid is 
recognized as hostile, also called unconsolidated bid. This occurs when the acquiring 
company is trying to acquire the target company directly through its share holders rather than 
through a mutual agreement with the target company’s board of directors. The expression of 
hostile takeover has its roots in the negative attitude expressed from the board of directors of 
the targeted company (Savela, 1999).  The reasons for the targets board of directors’ negative 
attitude can perhaps be explained by several reasons and not always related to the valuation of 
the actual bid. Some of them are; the board of directors’ fears that the acquisition will have a 
negative effect on the company’s growth, strategy, revenues or dividend, they may also 
experience fear of losing their jobs by being replaced by the biding company’s employees 
(Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, 2002). 
When facing a hostile takeover trough a hostile bid the board of directors will act accordingly 
to protect their independence and current management or to ensure that the hostile bidder is 
pressured to sweeten their bid further. Often, the main purpose of the chosen defense strategy 
is to make the acquisition more costly or time consuming and in such way making the 
targeted company less attractive due to the rise in cost which follows. This can be done 
through several different ways and theses measures are commonly called defense strategies, 
shark repellent tactics or antitakeover measures. These can be used in a reactive approach to 
fend off a presented hostile bid or be used in a proactive approach to make sure to that future 
raids from targeting companies are slows down or even hindered (Pearce & Robinson, 2004).  
There are many different defense strategies to use and are often used in combination with 
each other to ensure the effectiveness of the defense. There is no one-situation fit all strategy 
and therefore the choice of strategy is dependent on the acquisition strategy used by the 
acquirer and also what motives the targeted board of directors have available (Nilsson, 2001).  
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This section contains a review on some of the most common defense strategies and how they 
are designed to defend against a hostile takeover. These different measures can be divided in 
to proactive and reactive strategies, depending on when a company decides to adapt it. As 
their name suggests, a proactive measure is used to make the company less attractive before 
the actual hostile bid presents itself and the later one is implemented in connection to the 
hostile bid (Pearce & Robinson, 2004). 
 
2.4 Proactive Defense Measures  
2.4.1 Staggered Board 
 
One solution for a company which is seeking to take control over a targeted company is to try 
and get representation on the targeted company’s board. Why this approach is important for 
the acquirer is because by attaining representation and voting power on the board of directors, 
the targeting company can try to influence the other board members to accept the bid or 
influence the shareholders to take a more positive stance towards the takeover (Bebchuk, 
Coates & Subramanian, 2002). 
For a company to be allowed to create a staggered board, first its shareholders have to 
approve its creation on a shareholders meeting. Obtaining a seat on the board of directors can 
only be achieved through a shareholder meeting where the members are chosen with the 
support of the shareholders. This can be achieved by buying enough shares to vote with which 
enables a single shareholder to take a seat on the companies’ board of directors. By using a 
staggered board the process of gaining influence and control on the board is made very time 
consuming and costly. 
By now explaining how precisely a staggered board is constructed its effects will be clear. In 
a company with, for example nine members, a staggered board is created by dividing the 
members in to groups, typically in groups of three. Companies with staggered board do not re-
elect all the board members annually, instead they only submit a group of members for re-
election each year. This means that the entire group of board members cannot be replaced on 
one annual meeting. To replace the whole board it would take three years due to the structure 
of the staggered board. For example the targeting company my obtain three seats on the board 
initially  on the first annual meeting by buying shares, but must at least wait one more year for 
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the next annual meeting to re-elect three new members to obtain majority on the board of 
directors (Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, 2002). 
This shows that the staggered board tactic provides an effective protection against a hostile 
takeover when it comes to preventing the acquirer to gain control of the whole board 
instantly. What is clear is that this defense establishes a large delay for the bidder because it 
has to wait at least one more year and is also forced to win two elections separated in time to 
be able to gain control. This large delay is often associated, within the corporate world, with 
extra expenditures which can make it more difficult getting finance for the acquiring company 
and therefore making the targeted company less attractive (Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, 
2002). 
Studies that have been made by Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian (2002) has shown that the 
staggered board defense is moderate effective and substantially increases the companies’ 
likely hood of remaining independent 9-months after facing a hostile bid. Approximately 60 
per cent of the U.S corporations and almost one-half of the Standard & Poors 500 firms list 
have adopted a staggered board. Also mentioned in their studies is that this defense strategy 
can be costly for the shareholders, due to the negative effect it has on the acquisition premium 
presented by the targeting company. It was estimated that on average shareholders would get 
8-10 per cent less in acquisition premium from the bidder when adopting a staggered board. 
Though this tactic is moderately effective, it does not imply a definite protection against a 
hostile bid. As mentioned earlier, its effects are more or less threatening and delaying the 
bidder’s ability to take control instantly, meaning that the staggered board strategy would not 
prevent or revoke a bidder from buying a big block of it shares which eventually after re-
election of the board, the bidder would thus gain control. Also, it is argued that maybe the 
bidder would not even need to wait until the second re-election meeting. If the bidder has 
obtained majority shares in the company the remaining board members would be expected to 
resign thus the board would have little legitimacy when its largest shareholder clearly did not 
wish it to stay (Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, 2002). 
What is shown is that the staggered board strategy is moderately effective on its own and is 
not an ultimate defense against hostile takeovers but would be very effective in combination 
with other defense measures to help it fend off a hostile takeover. 
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“The staggered board tactic serves more as a nuisance to the acquiring firm than a true 
roadblock.” (Pearce & Robinson, 2004: page 19) 
 
 
2.4.2 Poison Pills 
 
We will in this section mention the general structure of a poison pill and also two of its most 
common forms, the “flip-over” pill and the “flip-in” pill.  
Poison pill is one of the most used and controversial defense strategies used. This strategy 
was first introduced 1982 by the New York layer Martin Lipton under the name “warrant 
dividend plan” but was later changed to poison pill when he mentioned it in an article in The 
Wall Street Journal.  The expression poison pill comes from the domains of espionage. This 
refers to back in the days when agents were instructed to swallow a cyanide pill instead of 
being captured or as in our case overtaken. When it comes to the corporate world the effect of 
the pill is similar. There are several variations of the pill, but most work roughly in the same 
way (Pearce & Robinson, 2004). 
Poison pills have many names and therefore also described as, shareholders rights, preferred 
shares, stock warrants or options, which the target company offers and issues to its 
shareholders. In the U.S the board of directors can incorporate a poison pill without asking the 
shareholders, but in some countries this must be decided through a shareholders voting, some 
of those countries are Canada and Sweden (Pearce & Robinson, 2004). Once implemented, 
the poison pill can only be redeemed by the board of directors. These rights are inactive until 
they are triggered. These rights are issued in the case of a hostile takeover and are triggered 
when an unwanted shareholder acquires a pre-specified amount of the outstanding stocks 
which has been agreed on by the board of directors. Once triggered, the poison pill can only 
be redeemed in a short period of time by the board of directors (Ruback, 1988). These pre-
specified thresholds can obviously be set in any range but are often set in the range of 15-20 
per cent of the stock for a single shareholder who has not been in contact with the board of 
directors. If the company receives an offer for a large amount of its stock at one single 
occasion, a so called tender offer, then the threshold is higher and often around 30 per cent 
(Pearce & Robinson, 2004). 
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The logic behind the pill is to dilute the targeting company’s stocks in the company so much 
that bidder never manages to achieve an important part of the company without the consensus 
of the board and thus loses both time and money on their investment. This is though not the 
only reason for the use of a poison pill as it has other implications. Two other aspects for the 
use of the pill can be seen as tools for creating more time. More time to reflect over the actual 
bid and maybe start some kind of negotiation process between the two companies to see if 
they can agree on some other terms or even put pressure on the bidder to raise its premium 
offer even further thus serving the shareholders wealth (Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, 
2002). Theobald (2006) also argues that the poison pill is a preventive measure even though it 
is implemented after a bid has been presented. Its features can be categorized as acquisition 
cost enhancers and force the bidding company to pay more for the stocks and in return makes 
the targeted company less attractive (Theobald, 2006). 
A flip-in pill makes it possible for the targeted company to issue preferred shares which only 
existing shareholders have the rights to buy. If they chose to exercise their rights then they 
will get the opportunity to buy additional shares in the company for a price often far beneath 
the market value of that share. These rights can explicitly not be exercised by the acquiring 
firm or shareholder, thus leading to the dilution of the bidders’ shares because it cannot 
compete with shareholders who can buy them for a discounted price. This literally pulls the 
brakes for the bidder and gives the targeted company time to reflect over the bidding situation 
and also gives the exciting shareholders incentives to not sell their shares to the bidder (Pearce 
& Robinson, 2004). 
A flip-over pill issues rights rather than issuing preferred shares to existing shareholders. 
These rights are only triggered and set in motion when 100 per cent of the firms’ shares have 
been bought. The flip-over pill gives the existing shareholders in the targeted company the 
right to buy the acquiring companies’ shares for a discounted price in the event of a total 
merger or acquisition. Using such rights is advantageous in defending a target because of its 
negative impact on a balance sheet which comes from the raise in debt to the shareholders as 
an affect of the rights. Increasing the debt means to raise the risk of the company’s financial 
leverage and thus seen as very unattractive for the acquirer who has to inherit these debts. One 
major drawback regarding the flip-over pill is that its actions are only made accessible when 
the company is acquired 100 per cent. This gives the bidder a loophole by gaining control of 
the company but not acquiring it fully and thus avoiding paying out the rights to the 
18 
 
shareholders. Therefore, such a poison pill is useful only for corporations looking to prevent a 
full acquisition (Pearce & Robinson, 2004). 
Once again these different forms of the poison pill have general weakness, which is that these 
pills can easily be redeemed by the board of directors and are thereby not extremely effective 
on its own. Therefore, you must have some kind of defense mechanism which protects the pill 
by making it difficult or impossible for the bidder to enter the board and thus redeem the pill 
its self, one of these measures would be to combine it with a staggered board (Bebchuk, 
Coates & Subramanian, 2002). 
2.4.3 Super-Majority Amendment 
 
Typically, when it comes to making decisions regarding a merger, approving takeover or 
other large decisions in a company you need a majority of the votes, >50 per cent of the votes, 
to approve the decision, meaning shares. But if a company implements a super-majority 
amendment in its corporate chart then this defense measure can raise this specific per cent age 
needed to approve large majority decisions to somewhere between 67 – 90 per cent. This 
amendment can only be placed in the companies chart by the shareholders and not by the 
board of directors, but it is the board who can decide to activate it. Regarding this defense 
strategy, the bidder does not actually have to own the share to complete a merger, it only have 
to present a merger proposal which then the shareholders have to vote on, but now have to 
acquire a larger acceptance (Ruback, 1988). 
Some super-majority amendments apply to all mergers and others does only apply in the 
event of a hostile takeover or when it involves a large stockholder. These amendments are 
often accompanied by escape clauses which allow the board of directors to redeem the 
amendment if the board decides to change its attitude towards the bid and enter negotiations 
thus not restraining the boards’ managerial power. 
However, this defense measure, once again, does not alone stop a bidding company from 
buying and acquiring a large stock of the targeted company. As with the poison pill this 
measure makes it impossible for a bidder to immediately gaining control over the company 
and thus making the deal costly and unattractive. Instead the targeted company buys time to 
reflect over the bid and perhaps negotiate or pressure the bidder to present a higher premium 
offer (Ruback, 1988). 
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2.4.4 Golden Parachutes 
 
Golden Parachute as a defense strategy is a special and lucrative package, which aims to 
stagger and make hostile takeovers more expensive by distributing what is usually a lump-
sum payment to the board of directors of the target company. The defense strategy sets in 
motion as soon as the acquiring firm has acquired a specific amount of the target company’s 
shares; the average per cent is 26.6 according to Lambert and Larcker (1985).The strategy is 
usually implemented in combination with other takeover defense measurements and 
according to a survey done by Lambert and Larcker, implementing golden parachutes as a line 
in defense measurements against hostile takeovers, on an average increased the wealth of the 
shareholders by 3 per cent. 
The Golden Parachute’s primary function in a hostile takeover is to align incentives between 
shareholders and the executives of the target company as there generally are concerns about 
executives who face a hostile takeover while risking losing their jobs, oppose the bid even 
when it increases the value for shareholders. Furthermore, Walking and Long (1984) in 
support of this rationale, concluded that the probability of executives opposing a takeover bid, 
is directly related to the takeover’s effect on their personal wealth. Thus, Golden Parachutes 
are in fact intended to help executives resist takeover attempts that endanger their jobs by 
aligning their wealth more closely with the shareholder’s interests (Pearce & Robinson, 
2004). Also, it is argued that if receiving a large payment in the event of a job loss, the 
managers will be less inclined to block any takeover attempts and therefore evaluating the 
best decision for the shareholders (Harris, 1990). 
In conclusion of this chapter, implementing a golden parachute defense strategy could 
potentially help stagger and make a hostile takeover more expensive, though only to a certain 
degree. In general the cash payments as a cause of the golden parachute strategy are only a 
drop in the ocean compared to what the whole acquirement as a whole would cost and for this 
reason, one could argue the real effectiveness of the golden parachute strategy. 
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2.5 Reactive Defense Measures 
2.5.1 Attack the Logic of The Bid” 
 
By attacking the logic of the bid, the board is trying to persuade the shareholders that a fusion 
will have a harmful outcome on both the company and the stock price. This is considered to 
be an effortless and cost beneficial tactic when facing a hostile bid. Arguments used is often 
that the bid is too low and is not adequately representative to the real value of the firm, that 
the two involved firms are operating in different industries and fusion will therefore have 
undesirable effect for the future. The board can also try to discourage their shareholders’ 
beliefs about the acquiring company through accusing them of being incompetent and only 
trying to acquire the firm’s assets. That action may not go as planned and maybe result in 
shareholder thinking that the board is only interested in keeping their positions and not taking 
the shareholders wealth in consideration (Weston et al, 2004). Management can also devolve 
insider information to other potential bidders, to encourage them to enter the bidding contest 
thus increasing the probability of a higher bid. Management could also raise doubt the merger 
and encourage shareholders to hold their shares for additional bids (Turk, 1992). 
2.5.2 White Knight & White Squire 
 
These two defense measures require and involve a third party. In the first, the targeted firm 
seeks for a friendly firm which can acquire a majority stake in the company and is therefore 
called a white knight. Whit a white knight the management of the targeted company can 
negotiate several deals that do not have to include a full takeover of the firm and risk losing 
their positions. A white knight can be chosen for several reasons such as; friendly intentions, , 
belief of better fit, belief of better synergies, belief of not dismissing employees or historical 
good relationships. The intention of the white knight strategy is to make sure that the 
company remains independent but could also be used to play the other two parties against 
each other to further sweeten the bid. However, the most common outcome of a white knight 
strategy would be that targeted firm eventually gets overtaken by the white knight. This 
implies that it is not always certain that the targeted company will remain independent but 
instead slips away from a hostile bidder which would suggest greater restructuring of the firm. 
The problem with this strategy is the complicated process of finding the white knight, because 
they do not often present them self (Weston, 2001). 
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A different variation of the white knight strategy is the white squire. Instead of acquiring a 
majority stake in the targeted company the white squire acquires a smaller portion, but enough 
to hinder the hostile bidder from acquiring a majority stake and thereby fending off an attack. 
A white squire is not always needed to be found but can also be created by raising an 
investment fund with the help of financial advisors. Here are hedge funds and banks suitable 
white squires due to their ability to move large amount of capital on short notice (Weston, 
2001). 
2.5.3 Greenmail 
 
If the bidders’ interests are short-termed profit rather than long-termed corporate control then 
an effective and simple defense measure could be to use a so called greenmail, also known as 
targeted repurchase or a goodbye kiss. Greenmail involves repurchasing a block of shares 
which is held by a single shareholder or other shareholders at a premium over the stock price 
in return for an agreement called a standstill agreement. In this standstill agreement it is stated 
that the bidder will no longer be able to buy more shares for a period of time, often longer 
than five years. Thereby, the hostile attack will end but what is worth re-mentioning is that 
this is only proven effective towards short-termed profits seeking bidders by offering 
incentives to a bidder to cease the offer and then sell its shares back at a profit. Not against 
bidders who is seeking long-termed synergy effects and control in the company. 
Since 1986 the use of this defense measure as drastically declined due to tax regulations 
which indices a 25 per cent age penalty on the company making the greenmail payment and 
therefore making it to a very expensive measure. But this measure is still used because of 
some bidders’ soul intentions still are to act in such a way so they receive a greenmail offer 
from the targeted company (Pearce & Robinson, 2004). 
2.5.4 Crown Jewel 
 
Very often a hostile bid is made based on the targeted firm’s assets or ongoing operations. By 
implementing a defense strategy such as the Crown Jewel defense, the target company has the 
right to sell of the entire or some of the company’s most valuable assets (Crown Jewels) when 
facing a hostile bid, in hope to make the company less attractive in the eyes of the acquiring 
company and to force a drawback of the bid. Another way of implementing this type of 
defense strategy is for the target company to sell its Crown Jewels to another friendly 
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company (White Knight) and later on, when and if the acquiring company withdraws its offer, 
buy back the assets sold to the White Knight at a fixed price agreed in advance (Weston, 
2001). 
The Crown Jewel strategy does not go without risks. By selling of the targeted company’s 
most valuable assets, one puts the whole operation of the company in danger and if the target 
company chooses to adopt a Crown Jewel strategy to sell of its most valuable assets to a 
White Knight, they need guarantee to able to buy the assets back. Another complication in the 
risks of adopting the Crown Jewel defense strategy has to do with the amount of cash or 
liquidation the target company is able to receive from a third party. If it turns out that the 
target firm received a lot of money for its assets, it could potentially make the company even 
more attractive to the acquirer, a result completely opposite the aims of the Crown Jewel 
defense strategy (Weston, 2001). 
 
2.5.5 Litigation 
 
After that a hostile bid has been received the targeted company can challenge the bid. 
Litigations are ways for companies to stall a hostile attack, but are often not effective against 
long-term bidders. The litigations often involve pursuing legal injunction, filing antitrust 
litigations, restraining orders or filing a law suit against the bidding company. This pressures 
the bidder to gather information to prove its legitimacy of the takeover, often towards the 
institution in each country that handles these matters, in U.S it is the Security Exchange 
Committee (SEC). During the time the bidder is preparing and presenting its legal 
preferences, the targeted company receives a space to implement other defense measures or to 
pressure the bidder to sweeten the bid additionally in exchange drop the litigations. 
These litigations can also be a step in the board of director’s propaganda against the bidder, 
with intentions to make its shareholders react more harmfully towards the bid in general by 
implying that there might be something wrong with their intentions. Also, these litigations 
often pressures the bidding company to reveal its post-acquisitions plans for the company, 
which may even more strengthen the board of directors arguments towards the bid (Pearce & 
Robinson, 2004). 
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3 Method 
We will in this thesis use a deductive approach, where theories will be used as guidance when 
searching for explanations. Regarding the defense strategies which will be presented in the 
theoretical framework, data will be collected with the purpose of seeking if they are effective, 
how they are implemented and if they have been implemented in recent years and what 
happened in those specific occasions. The deductive approach is also most fitting with using 
secondary data, which is the case in this thesis. In other words, this thesis will use secondary 
data to come up with explanations, and not carry out any interviews or any other processes to 
collect primary data. 
Theoretical approach 
By using and implementing our research in the theoretical framework combined with the 
presentation of three cases, we hope to deepen the reader’s understanding of the whole 
context which regards hostile takeovers. The cases presented in the latter part of our paper, are 
of qualitative nature, whereas according to Denzin & Lincoln (2005), a qualitative approach is 
suitable when grasping and understanding context is important.  
In our analyzes, theoretical frameworks along with our previous knowledge, new 
acknowledgements accompanied by common sense, have allowed us to draw conclusions in 
comparing and analyzing the different outcomes of each case study. Given the unique nature 
of each hostile takeover situation, it is not possible to draw generalizations concerning all 
takeover events. However, the data collected and learned from the theoretical framework has 
allowed us to make reasonable conclusions and assumptions about the three case studies 
individually and to hopefully realize some kind of pattern as well as specifics about hostile 
takeovers. 
Case study 
When analyzing the different case studies, we have chosen to look at the cases about Arcelor 
& Mittal Steel, Lundin Mining & Equinox Minerals and Schaeffler & Continental AG. We 
believe these case studies are especially relevant to our thesis, based on the share size and 
media attention they have received. Furthermore, the several actions taken by each part in the 
three case studies are relatively unlike each other, which further broadens our data collection 
and give possibility for comparison and discussions between the two cases. We further 
acknowledge the fact that the case about Lundin Mining & Equinox Minerals has still not 
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reached a conclusion and the final outcome is still yet to discover. Some might argue about 
the credibility from the latter case since a final outcome has not yet been reached, but to 
justify our bringing of the case into our thesis, we believe the most relevant and useful data 
collected from each case study come from the different implementations and strategies used in 
a given situation. 
There are however some disadvantages in using case studies. According to Cavye, (citied in 
Williamson, 2000) the collection of analysis and data are dependent and influenced by the 
researchers’ characteristics and backgrounds.  
Collection of data 
As we have mentioned earlier, this thesis will be conducted mainly by collecting and 
analyzing prior research, articles and press releases within the field of hostile takeovers. Our 
focus of data collection will therefore mainly consist of secondary data, which according to 
(Lundahl, 1999), is both less costly and more efficient to gather compared to collection of 
primary data. Furthermore, this data will be collected from not only previously done research 
papers on mergers & acquisitions and hostile takeovers, but also from the Internet in forms 
and news articles, press releases and official media releases from the concerning companies in 
our case studies as well as from libraries.  
Information concerning the theoretical aspect in our thesis will be mainly collected from 
library, books and written papers. These collections of data are especially important in order 
to grasp and understand the underlying logic and reason behind the situation in every case 
study as well as draw analyzes and conclusions in our findings.  
Regarding the empirical findings for our case studies, most are gathered from the Internet 
through business press, companies’ reports, media and press releases. The reliability of these 
kinds of data collection could be doubtful since the accuracy of the answers explained highly 
depends on the potential subjective characteristic and attitude of the interviewees. The case 
studies which have been chosen in this investigation has been highly and widened highlighted 
in the media and press and although using information from the press might not always 
guarantee a 100 per cent accuracy on the data collected, we believe the nature of the required 
data to fulfill our purpose with this thesis, is not very sensitive to bias. 
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4 Case Studies 
In this chapter of our thesis, we will present and discuss our case studies. They consist of the 
merger between Arcelor & Mittal, Lundin Mining & Equniox and Schaeffler & Continental 
AG. The structure of the cases is as follows: A general presentation of the parties, the bid, 
reactions to the bid and finally what the defending company did. 
4.1 Mittal & Arcelor  
All data presented in the case about Arcelor and Mittal are collected from the book 
International Management, Som 2009(pages 329-350) if no other source is mentioned 
4.1.1 The Bid 
 
On 27 January, 2006 Mittal Steel, the India-based world’s top steel producer with its 
headquarters in the Netherlands, announced a hostile bid for Arcelor, the world’s largest steel 
producer in terms of turnover at that time. Arcelor was at the time the world’s second largest 
steel producer and the bid from Mittal Steel caused a lot of opposition and many parts got 
involved, including the former French President Jacques Chirac who publicly opposed the 
hostile offer. If successful, the bid would have created the world’s first 100 million ton plus 
steel producer, creating an entity four times larger than Mittal Steel’s, at the time, closest 
rival.  
Mittal Steel offered a €28.21 per Arcelor share, which meant that Arcelor would be receiving 
a premium of 27 per percent per share since the offer was 27 per cent over the market price 
for one Arcelor share and the total offer on Arcelor from Mittal was valued €18.6 billion. The 
merger would furthermore create a company whose market position in steel production as 
well as in the automotive sector, would be world leading in NAFTA, the EU, central Europe, 
Africa and South Africa. Moreover, Mittal Steel’s stand-alone raw material (iron ore) had a 
self-sufficiency rate at 60 per cent and this capacity combined with Arcelor, would create the 
world’s fourth largest iron ore producer.  
The offer was subject to three conditions:  (1) a minimum acceptance of more than 50 per 
cent; (2) Mittal Steel shareholder approval and the Mittal family undertaking to vote in favor 
of the transaction; and (3) no change in Arcelor’s substance, in other words no disposal or 
acquisition from Arcelor was allowed during the offer. The offer from Mittal consisted of a 
mixture of cash and stocks as the main offer from Mittal consisted of four Mittal Steel shares 
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plus an additional of €35.25 cash in exchange for five Arcelor shares (or 0.8 Mittal shares 
plus an additional €7.05 cash for each Arcelor share). Alternative offers consisted of 16 Mittal 
shares for 15 Arcelor shares or as previously mentioned €28.21 for each Arcelor share.  
 
4.1.2 Reactions to The Bid 
 
This hostile bid did not come without repercussions or criticism. The board of Arcelor stated 
that the company did not share the same strategic vision, business model or values as Mittal 
Steel, risking severe consequences on the group, shareholders, employees and its customers. 
(Som, 2009) 
Furthermore the management of Arcelor, in attempt to scare its shareholders about the 
takeover, explained that the merger did not make any ‘industrial sense’ and used what in the 
theoretical framework is referred as an ‘attack on the logic of the bid’ by Weston et al (2004) 
in 2.5.1 which gave the same results as the defense strategy in theory should do, which was to 
buy Arcelor time as well as increase the bid premium received.. Arcelor argued that the Mittal 
Steel Company had weak corporate governance, implemented a monoculture management 
and a weak strategy. The management of Arcelor continued stating that the shareholders of 
the company would be better off without Mittal Steel, thus forming a defense strategy against 
the hostile takeover, ‘Project Tiger‘ (Som, 2009). 
Arcelor originally emerged from national steel interests from France, Luxembourg and Spain 
while also operating in Belgium. Even though only Luxembourg possesses shares in the 
company (5, 6 per cent), France, Spain and Luxembourg had publicly opposed the takeover 
while Belgium remained neutral. In result, the prime minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude 
Juncker appeared in the press, saying that the bid was “incomprehensible” and encouraged 
initiatives to stop the takeover by “all necessary means”. Soon the French Prime minister 
Dominique de Villepin and Finance Minister Thierry Breton joined in, questioning the bid’s 
‘industrial logic’ as well as pushing for a mobilization of ‘economic patriotism’. The takeover 
issue even moved to the top of the agenda list when the French President Jacques Chirac met 
with Mr. Juncker in Luxembourg days later. Furthermore, Spain’s Finance Minister 
announced its opposition against the bid and the Belgium government, which owned 2.6 
percent share in Arcelor, even appointed Lazard in order to conduct a more thorough analyze 
27 
 
of the bid. Even the Department of Justice of the US government got involved in the issue, 
announcing they would conduct an antitrust review of the deal (ArcelorMittal, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, in an attempt to protect French companies from hostile takeovers, Thierry 
Breton, the French minister of Economy, Finance and Industry at the time, proposed a new 
law, allowing companies listed in the principality to issue new shares without calling for a 
meeting with the shareholders when a hostile takeover is at hand. This new law meant in 
practice that the bidding company needs a 95 per cent share in the target company, in order to 
force minority shareholders to sell. As the discussions went on, nationality, culture and 
patriotism had been associated with the refusal of the bid. Since the chairman and CEO of 
Mittal Steel, Lakshmi Mittal originally is an Indian-born citizen, the Indian government felt 
need to protect and support him, thus resulting in that the Indian Trade Minister, Kamal 
Nathn,  publicly accused the European governments of being racist and discriminating (Som, 
2009). 
4.1.3 What Arcelor Did 
 
Project tiger 
While facing the hostile bid from Mittal Steel, Arcelor developed a communication plan, 
‘Project Tiger’, in hope to prove to and to persuade its shareholders that the company was 
better off without Mittal Steel’s involvement and to not sell their shares to Mittal Steel. They 
introduced a ‘2006-2008 plan’ with the aim to ‘maximize value creation for shareholders’ and 
the board of Arcelor even promised an increase in results by 24 per cent and generous 
bonuses.  
In the last week of May 2006, the management of Arcelor announced a €13.6 billion merger 
proposal with Severstal, the largest Russian steelmaker, as an attempt from being hostelry 
overtaken by Mittal Steel. If this merger would have succeeded, a combination of the second 
largest steel company and the largest Russian steel company would have created globally the 
largest and most profitable steel company in the world, removing Mittal from its number one 
position.  The offer from Severstal was described as friendly as they valued each share of 
Arcelor to a price at €44, which represented a 100 per cent premium compared to Arcelor’s 
closing share price on 26 January 2006.  
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The possible merger did not get positive reactions from analysts, who described a merger with 
Mittal Steel as a more attractive and reasonable option than merging with Severstal. Severstal-
Arcelor would geographical have been mainly restricted to the EU, Russia and Latin America, 
whereas a merger with Mittal would contribute to a greater global presence, a larger 
production capacity and a greater self-sufficiency for iron ore (ArcelorMittal, 2011). 
Even though rumors were cited in the press about a defense strategy against the Hostile bid 
from Mittal, Arcelor did not adopt the in our theoretical framework mentioned ‘White Knight’ 
defense strategy by Weston (2001) in 2.5.2, which in theory would have made the offer by 
Mittal even more expensive and time consuming. Eventually Mittal agreed to pay €40.27 for 
each Arcelor share, almost double the amount they first offered, and a merger between the 
two giants occurred. Furthermore, Arcelor had to pay Severstal a fine of €140 million, as a 
result in failing to close a deal after negotiations with the Russian giant. 
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4.2 Lundin Mining Corporation & Equinox Minerals Ltd  
 
Lundin Mining Corporation which is Canadian based, is a diversified base metals mining 
company with operations in Portugal, Sweden, Spain and Ireland, producing copper, zinc, 
lead and nickel. It has an annual production capacity of almost 250 thousand tons of metal. In 
addition, Lundin Mining holds a development project pipeline which includes expansion 
projects at its Zinkgruvan and Neves-Corvo mines along with its equity stake in the world 
class Tenke Fungurume copper/cobalt project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Lundin 
Mining, 2011). 
Equinox Minerals Limited is an international mining company with an annual production of 
145 thousand tons of copper, which is listed in Canada and Australia. The Company is 
currently focused on operating its 100 per cent owned large scale Lumwana copper mine in 
Zambia, one of the largest new copper mines to be developed globally over the last decade 
and the construction of the Jabal Sayid Copper-Gold project in Saudi Arabia (Equinox 
Minerals, 2011). 
4.2.1 The Bid 
 
On Monday the 28 of February 2011, did Lundin Mining Corp receive a hostile takeover bid 
for the whole company from Equinox. The tender offer was valuing its offer to C$4.8 billion 
in cash and shares. The announcement provides that once the offer is commenced that each 
Lundin Mining shareholder will be able to elect to receive consideration per Lundin Mining 
common share of either C$8.10 in cash or 1.2903 shares of Equinox plus $0.01 for each 
Lundin Mining common share. The Offer reflects a 26 per cent premium to the closing price 
of C$6.45 per Lundin share on the TSX on February 25, 2011. They also announce that the 
bid would be funded with a loan of $3.2 billion from Goldman Sach Partners and Credit 
Suisse Securities.  
They did also present some of the highlights regarding a potential acquisition and what that 
may result in. Some of them where; (1) Equinox believes that the combination of Equinox’s 
and Lundin’s will position the combined company to deliver significant value to its 
shareholders through its superior strength in copper prices and strong growth profile. (2) 
Growth would be delivered entirely from lower risk expansions of existing operations and a 
project currently under construction. (3) The combination of Equinox and Lundin will also 
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deliver a significantly higher copper production over the next six years to 500 thousand tons 
(Equinox Minerals, 2011). 
4.2.2 Reactions to The Bid 
 
On the 20 of March, Lundin Mining announced that after careful consideration of the bid that 
they recommend their shareholders to reject the tender offer from Equinox. Their 
recommendations to not accept the offer was based on several reasons, such as: (1) Equniox 
has undervalued the assets owned by the company, (2) They seek control without paying an 
adequate premium for the control. Since they day of the announcement the share has risen and 
the bid is now only 6 per cent over share price. This is substantially low for these types of 
transactions in this industry, where the average premium has been of 64 per cent since 2004 
for transactions over $100 million. (3) There are no strategic benefits for Lundin Mining 
shareholders under the Unsolicited Offer. The acquisition would results in a company with 
high Africa and Middle East concentration and few, if any synergies with Lundin Mining's 
business and their lack of knowledge regarding minerals other than copper. (4) Also these 
differences would have a negative effect on the stock price and hence affect the shareholders 
negatively. (5) Due to the extensive loan for the funding of the bid the lenders to Equinox will 
have considerable influence over the business decisions of a combined Equinox and Lundin 
Mining. (6) The takeover would present increased financial risk due to that short-term cash 
flow will be utilized to pay for: lenders' fees; interest charges; and the principal repayments of 
the debt incurred to fund the offer (Lundin Mining, 2011). 
4.2.3 What Lundin Mining Did 
 
On the 29 of March 2011, Lundin Mining announced that its Board of Directors has adopted a 
limited duration Shareholder Rights Plan, also called a Poison Pill, to enable a full 
consideration of their strategic alternatives, develop and negotiate alternatives to maximize 
shareholder value. The Rights Plan also seeks to ensure the fair treatment of shareholders and 
to provide them with adequate time to properly assess any potential take-over bid without 
undue pressure. 
Mr. Philip Wright, President and CEO stated “This plan has been put in place to ensure that 
we have adequate time to explore all alternatives to bring value to Lundin shareholders.” 
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The details regarding the pill were also revealed which explained that it was flip-in pill. As 
mentioned earlier, this meant that Lundin Mining now could offer its existing shareholders 
preferred shares far beneath the market price and thereby removing incentives for 
shareholders to sell share to Equniox. 
On April 3, 2011 MMR a Chinese state owned mining company, announced its intention to 
make an all cash takeover offer for Equinox of C$7.00 per share, being a 33% premium to the 
20 trading day VWAP of Equinox Shares on the TSX to April 1, 2011. This offer was 
described by Equinox as being "opportunistic" and "Such a low premium is a fraction of 
premiums paid in recent acquisitions of base metal mining companies". 
Commenting on this, Mr. Phil Wright, Chief Executive Officer of Lundin Mining, said, "This 
response by Equinox seems very hypocritical seeing that they are urging Lundin Mining 
shareholders to accept an offer that is significantly worse than what has been offered to 
Equinox's shareholders by MMR." (EPC Engineer, 2011) 
Mr. Lucas Lundin commented on the adoption of the pill by saying that he is not against 
selling if it achieves an excellent financial return to the shareholders but will not support 
selling at a bargain price (Lundin Mining, 2011). 
Until this day, 30 of July 2011, there has not been any changes regarding the premium of the 
bid and both parties have not managed to negotiate any further deals. Equinox’s CEO said 
that they had no urgent plans to sweeten the bid when there is no other competing bid against 
them. This may change because analysts have predicted that Lundin Mining may attract other 
company who wishes to secure assets of copper if copper prices continue to increase. 
(Bloomberg Businessweek, 2011) 
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4.3 Schaeffler Group & Continental AG 
 
Schaeffler Group 
In 1883, Friedrich Fischer develops the ball grinding machine, which allows grinding of large 
volumes of hardened steel balls, to absolute roundness. The innovation starts its success story 
all over the world and later that year a company was founded, which today is recognized as 
the Schaeffler Group. 
The Schaeffler Group, based in the town of Herzogenaurach, Germany, is one of the largest 
German and European industrial companies in family ownership. The company is currently 
owned by mother and son Maria-Elisabeth- and Georg Schaeffler with Juergen Geissinger as 
the current CEO.  
The company develops and produces high-precision products and parts for everything that 
moves: machines, equipment, vehicles as well as aviation and aerospace applications. The 
company is currently present in over 50 countries, at 180 locations and employs around 
70,000 people worldwide. Its biggest brands are INA, FAG and LuK which are active in the 
automotive, industrial as well as in the aerospace divisions. As the company seeks to develop 
and enhance its products, a significant amount has been invested by the group into research 
and development, most recently in new R&D centers in Asia and North America. As the 
company is characterized by creative engineering and unconventional solutions, around 4,800 
employees work in more than 32 research and development centers around the world, looking 
for future solutions. The group currently owns the rights to more than 14,000 patents and 
patent applications and around 1,100 inventions are file for patent applications every year.  
(Schaeffler Group, 2011) 
Continental AG 
The Continental corporation was founded in Hanover 1871. At the time it was known as the 
stock corporation “Continental – Caotchouch- und Gutta- Percha Compagnie. The 
manufacturing at the main factory in Hanover consisted of oft rubber products, rubberized 
fabrics, and solid tires for carriages and bicycles.  
Today, with its around 148,200 employees working in 46 countries worldwide, Continental is 
the second largest automotive supplier in Europe and ranks among the top 5 automotive 
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suppliers in the world. The company is divided into the Automotive Group and the Rubber 
Group and consists mainly of six division, 
• Chassis & Safety embraces the company’s core competence in networked driving 
safety, brakes, driver assistance, passive safety and chassis components. 
• Powertrain represents innovative and efficient system solutions for powertrains. 
• Interior combines all activities relating to information in the vehicle. 
• Passenger and Light Truck Tires develops and manufactures tires for compact, 
medium-size, and full-size passenger cars, as well as for SUVs, vans, motorcycles, and 
bicycles. 
• Commercial Vehicle Tires offers a wide range of truck, bus, industrial, and off-road 
tires for the most diverse service areas and application requirements. 
• ContiTech develops and produces functional parts for the automotive industry.  
In 2010, sales reached an estimate of 26 million Euros.  (Continental AG, 2011) 
 
4.3.1 The Bid 
On 15 July, 2008, the Schaeffler Group announced a takeover bid for the three times larger 
Continental AG at a price of €69,37 per share. The aim was to acquire a strategic 
shareholding of more than 30% in the company (eBearing, 2008). 
 
4.3.2 Reactions to The Bid 
The Executive Board of Continental AG at the time rejected the offer because they did not 
think it represented the true and full value of the company. Thus, they rejected the bid and 
also attacked the logic of the bid by stating that: “The strategic benefits of a closer 
collaboration of both companies are very limited. Schaeffler would benefit from Continental, 
but Continental not from Schaeffler”.  
Schaeffler Group on the other hand, insisted that its offer was “based on sound business 
logic” and denied that they in any way have acted unlawfully, as suggested by Continental 
(eBearing, 2008). 
As the negotiations went on, the Schaeffler Group bypassed the board of directors of 
Continental AG and instead turned and went directly to investors and shareholders, offering 
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them €70.12 cash for each of their shares. They were able to do so because of the previously 
proposed official bid made by the group on Continental AG. By lodging an official offer, 
Schaeffler were not obligated to make another and could therefore under the radar creep to 
majority control by gaining control over shareholders individually. Furthermore, the 
Schaeffler Group secured to buy 36 per cent of Continental’s stock at a total price of €11 
billion through several swap deals that banks organized on its behalf (Bloomberg, 2010).  
4.3.3 What Continental AG Did 
As mentioned earlier their first action was to reject the bid and attack the logic of the bid. In 
its final attempt, Continental tried to look for a ‘White Knight’ as they evaluated different 
hedge funds and other tire manufacturers. They failed to secure any serious interest and as 
negotiations went on, Schaeffler finally decided to raise its offer from €70.12 to €75 which 
values Continental AG to a total of €12.1 billion. Continental first rejected the bid but later on 
settled for an agreement in which the conditions will be official by the year of 2012 (NY 
Times, 2008). These are:  
• Schaeffler will buy more than 49.99% of Conti until 2012 
• Conti will remain publicly traded 
• Offer remains at €75 per share 
• Schaeffler will pay up to €522 million to cover any financial impact on Conti 
• Conti's Hanover headquarters will remain in place 
• Conti's relative debt will not increase without consent 
• Both companies will seek to develop synergistic strategic projects 
• Conti has the authority to raise Schaeffler's ownership limit 
• Conti CEO, Manfred Wennemer, leaves the company 
• Conti shareholders have until September 16 to tender their shares 
• Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder is authorized to enforce the contract 
(eBearing, 2008). 
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5 Analyze 
5.1 Comments and Recommendations: Mittal & Arcelor 
 
According to what we have managed to learn from the Arcelor-Mittal case, a hostile takeover 
goes rarely flawless or without opposition. Since dealing with such a big player like Arcelor, 
one might think that the opposition faced by Mittal Steel was inevitable, and surely enough 
several governmental organs and actors opposed the bid issued by Mittal.  
What Arcelor did to prevent the hostile takeover to a start, was to develop a communications 
plan, ‘Project Tiger’, in hope to convince its shareholders not to sell their stocks. Furthermore, 
they looked for alternatives, thus engaging negotiations with Russian Severstal in hope to 
create a mergence through what in media and press had been referred as a ‘friendly’ merger. 
The deal never closed and Arcelor failed to adopt what potentially could have been a “White 
Knight” defense strategy. 
What we would have liked to see from Arcelor’s side in its line of fending off the hostile bid 
from Mittal Steel, is perhaps that they would have considered implementing other strategic 
defense strategies, such as either Staggered Board or even the Poison Pill defense. These 
options are available of course only to Arcelor before receiving a hostile bid.  Arcelor could 
have had issued a proposal with the consent from their shareholders, to implement certain 
defense actions that would have had a pro-active effects when facing a hostile takeover. 
Furthermore, we believe it is rather ignorant of Arcelor not to have prepared certain defense 
measurements against future potential hostile takeovers, based on the share size and attractive 
market position of the company. One would think that such a well-established and big 
company such as Arcelor, competing globally, would have had developed defense 
measurements to fend off any hostile attempt on the company. 
With the implementation of the poison pill defense measurement, Arcelor could have 
potentially diluted their stocks, thus forcing the bidder to have consensus from the board of 
directors, in order to be able to gain ownership over enough amount of stocks to control the 
company. Furthermore, the poison pill defense strategy also works as a tool for creating more 
time. More time for the target company to evaluate and analyze the bid and logic behind it 
while potentially engaging negotiations with the bidder in hope to increase its bid offer, thus 
receiving a higher bid premium which in the end increases the wealth of the shareholders. 
36 
 
A flip-in poison pill enables the target company to issue new shares when facing a hostile bid. 
The new shares issued, are available to the target company’s shareholders only and are 
usually sold at a price far beneath the market price of the share. This makes it more difficult 
for the bidder to gain a majority stake of the shares in the company, thus buying the target 
firm some time to reflect over the actual bid as well as potentially increasing the bid premium 
received from the bidder.  
Furthermore, the poison pill defense strategy could be implemented in combination with for 
instance, the staggered board defense strategy. A combination of these two defense 
measurements would potentially have made the bid issued by Mittal, far more time 
consuming and probably a lot more expensive. In practice, the Staggered Board defense 
strategy, prohibit a replacement of the entire board of directors of the targeted firm in one 
single year. By implementing the Staggered Board strategy, the acquiring firm is only allowed 
to replace parts of the management and board of directors each year, even if they have control 
and the majority in shares. 
In conclusion of this case study, based on the case study on Mittal-Arcelor and the different 
strategies used in defense, we believe that the actions taken by Arcelor was relatively 
rationale and reasonable. They did not implement any official conventional defense strategy, 
but instead developed a communications plan, in hope to persuade its shareholders not to sell 
to Mittal Steel. They engaged negotiations with Russian Severstal, the possible White Knight 
for Arcelor, but the deal never went through. According to our research, there were possible 
alternatives for Arcelor in defending against the hostile bid. For instance, they could have 
implemented either a poison pill defense strategy, a staggered board defense strategy or even 
the two of them combined for the best potential result. Instead, Mittal Steel increased its offer 
for Arcelor and this time, a merger between the two giants was a fact. 
5.2 Comments and Recommendations: Lundin Mining & Equniox Minerals 
Ltd 
 
What we can see after following these events that has taken place between Lundin Mining and 
Equniox, is that it is proven that the poison pill serves as an excellent defense measure. It was 
show in the case that the implementation of the pill really stopped Equinox in its tracks and 
created time for Lundin Mining. Gain time to really gather its resources, investigate the bid 
and give its shareholders the opportunity to make an unstressed and informative decision. 
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Also time to consider further strategically alternatives, attract other bidders and initiate 
negotiations that would benefit the shareholders wealth. All these effects go hand in hand with 
what was mentioned in the framework regarding poison pills by Pearce & Robinson (2004) in 
2.4.2. 
From our view Lundin Mining proceeded with all the right measures to fend off or at least 
stop a hostile takeover. By fast reacting to the bid and doing an excellent work on dissecting 
the offer and attacking the logic of the different part of the bid, they probably put a lot of 
pressure on Equniox and induced a lot of trust in its shareholders mind, which was explained 
by Weston et al (2004) in 2.5.1. Also, by fast introducing the adoption of the pill they showed 
that they really are serious with their arguments and will not move their stand until they have 
reached better understanding regarding the bid. 
We feel that they now could take two possible directions. First, if their intentions are to get a 
better offer they could now try to find a White Squire or find a second biding company. This 
action would probably not scare away Equniox but instead even further pressure Equinox to 
engage in a bidding contest to secure Lundin Mining’s assets. Second, if their intentions are to 
completely cancel the bid, with the consent from their shareholders, they could now try to find 
a White Knight or continue to stall the negotiations until Equniox finds the takeover to 
unattractive and time consuming and perhaps in a worst case scenario proceed with a Crown 
Jewel strategy combined with litigations. 
5.3 Comments and Recommendations:  Schaeffler Group & Continental AG 
 
What we have been able to learn from the third and final case about Schaeffler & Continental 
AG is once again that a company which is publically listed can never be 100 per cent safe 
from future hostile takeovers. Even if the targeted company’s size succeeds the bidder’s by 
many folds, it is still very possible for the bidding company to gain control or influence over 
the targeted one, as this third and final case in our thesis evidentially shows.  
In the beginning of the negotiations, Continental AG did refuse the bid offered by Schaeffler, 
stating it to be an unfair evaluation of the company while attacking the logic of the bid, asking 
their shareholders not to sell to Schaeffler Furthermore, Continental AG stated that a fusion 
would much more benefit the smaller Schaeffler than it ever would Continental AG. The 
negotiations were prolonged and Continental AG hired an investigator in order to state what 
they believed were a fairer evaluation of the company. As negotiations continued, Schaeffler 
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managed to secure a substantial ownership of more than 30 per cent of Continental AG 
through several banks and financial deals. Schaeffler continued buying single shareholder’s 
stake in the company as they slowly worked towards even more influence over Continental 
AG. At this point, we would have liked to have seen more defense measurements 
implemented by Continental AG, for example the poison pill defense strategy, in order to 
potentially make the bid offered by Schaeffler more costly if not more time consuming, 
allowing them to find another way out. No such defense measurement was taken but instead 
Continental AG tried to adopt a White Knight at the very end of negotiations, which failed. 
The negotiations have now ended with Schaeffler being allowed to buy up to 49.99 per cent of 
Continental AG by the year 2012. 
5.3 Summary 
 
To sum up our thesis about “Mergers & Acquisitions: Hostile takeovers and defense 
strategies against them”, we have learned that there are three common ways of making 
acquisitions today. They consist of merging with another company, purchasing the target 
company’s stocks and the purchase of the target company’s most vital equities. If the main 
reason for acquisition is to seek productivity improvements, it is called a vertical acquisition. 
Horizontal acquisition is characterized by motives such as improving presence and increasing 
market share, while a conglomerated acquisition aims to diversify one’s risks by investing in 
other industries.  
We further conclude that hostile takeovers very much have occurred in the past, as they are 
still occurring today. Additionally, there is a thin line between whether an offer being hostile 
or friendly, since a friendly offer or takeover eventually could develop into a hostile bid. 
The reasons and motives behind a hostile bid, is pretty much the same as with other 
acquisitions. By merging with or acquiring another company, the bidder seeks advantages and 
cost savings through, for instance, economy of scale and potential synergies. Furthermore, 
hostile takeovers are often used when the motive or goal of the bidder is to replace an 
ineffective management of a company with strong growth potential.  
There are several defense measurements for a target company to implement when facing a 
hostile bid or offer. Some of them which we have presented are pro-active while others are re-
active. The pro-active ones, which are to be implemented and prepared before a hostile event, 
are; staggered board, golden parachute, super-majority amendment and the poison pill defense 
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strategy. The re-active ones, which are to be implemented once facing a hostile bid, are; the 
white knight and squire defense strategy, greenmail, litigation and the crown jewel defense 
strategy. These defense measurements are preferably implemented in combination of each 
other and do not guarantee a withdrawal of the hostile bid offered, but can help stagger the bid 
as well as potentially increase the bid premium offered by the bidder. 
We will not present a short comparison between the three case studies which aims to get a 
better overview of their actions and results. 
Cases Defense measure Defense measure Result 
Arcelor & Mittal Attack the bid White Knight initiative Merger 
Lundin & Equinox Attack the bid Poison Pill initiative  Unsettled/halted 
Schaeffler & Continental Attack the bid White Knight initiative Merger planed 2012 
 
What we can observe from the chart above is that that each and every one has reacted initially 
in the same order, with attacking the logic of the bid. There after there are some differences in 
the second line or action of defense. What is interesting to notice is that in the cases where a 
white knight has been used it has eventually resulted in a merger whit the hostile company 
and not really resulted in a continued independence. However, from the Lundin & Equniox 
case the implementation of the poison pill has halted the whole negation process and is until 
this day still unsettled and Lundin remain independent. We believe that the result regarding 
the Lundin & Equniox case is a result of the true effectiveness of the poison pill and its 
construction. This truly stops and halts a hostile takeover attempt in its tracks and therefore 
has made it too hard for Equniox to overcome further negation processes. Regarding the white 
knight strategy it seems to merely ignite a bidding contest which further sweetens the bid and 
do not actually stop the takeover. Something that we have discussed earlier is the lack of 
defense measure taken from both Arcelor and Continental AG. We feel that it is odd that they 
have not chosen to implement more defense measure, but this may have its reasons in what 
final achievement they wish to accomplish. 
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6 Conclusions & Implications 
 
What we have managed to learn from the three case studies about Arcelor & Mittal, Lundin 
Mining & Equniox and Schaeffler & Continental AG is that most companies can never be 
totally certain about future hostile takeovers. Given this reason, we believe it is crucial today 
for any company to develop and prepare some kind of a defense strategy, especially if the 
company is as big as Arcelor was before the merger with Mittal. Furthermore, we were 
actually surprised about the lack in defense measurements taken by Arcelor against Mittal, 
considering the share size of former Arcelor. One would assume that such a big player as 
Arcelor would be able to fend off almost any hostile attack, but evidently that was not the 
case. In contrary, when analyzing the case of Lundin Mining & Equniox, we found that 
Lundin Mining initially attacked the logic of the hostile bid offered by Equniox. They then 
continued adopting the poison pill defense strategy, specifically the flip-in method, and 
managed to put the deal on hold as they got more time to reflect and negotiate the terms of the 
bid and has not still been overtaken. As with the case of Arcelor & Mittal, we were once again 
surprised that a smaller company as Schaeffler, with a share third size of Continental AG, has 
managed to engage in hostile negotiations and not to mention, settle a deal with the giant 
Continental AG in 2012.  
It is now known that there are several different defense measures one could use to fend off a 
hostile takeover against a firm that is targeting your company. It has also been shown that 
these different measures have various motives behind their implementation and their 
outcomes are not always 100 per cent accurate or forecasted. Some are very delicate 
constructed and some have very simple logic behind them. What we also have learned is that 
there is no one-size fit all solution when facing a hostile takeover. There are many variables to 
consider before implementing them and not all of them may be offered on every occasion. 
After reviewing the cases and data presented in the literal review, we could find that there 
were some defense measures that were more common and favorable to implement in the event 
of a hostile bid than others. This was observed both regarding defense measures that where 
proactive or reactive to a hostile bid and the reason for this was often in line with their 
effectiveness to stop a bidder and the time it took to implement them. 
Also observed was that a lot of these measures are more effective in combination with other 
defense measure, rather than implemented on their own. This shows us the complicated world 
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of the corporate business where there is no room for errors and a lot of preparation work has 
to be done to have a smooth transaction. What we also could observe was that there is no pre 
outlined steps in how a hostile bid should be met and countered, instead the process depends 
more on the negotiations and the measures taken in the right time.  
Something that also is important to mention is that all of these defense measure often can lead 
to controversial discussion about which party they really serve. Is it the board of directors’ 
interest or the shareholders interest that are taken in to consideration? What gradually is 
occurring is that more power is shifting from the board of the directors towards the 
shareholders, which will be more involved in the process of implementing different defense 
measurement. 
Now, try to give somewhat of an answer on the purpose of the thesis; investigate which 
defense strategies are the most effective and easiest to put into practice? 
We feel, after reviewing our literal work that a combination of a good prepared plan that 
includes both proactive measures and reactive measures is to prefer, also that a combination 
of different defense measures in the proactive group and reactive group measures is the 
ultimate defense. Depending on if you intentions are to fully make the bidder withdraw their 
offer, in consent with the shareholders, or to prevent immediately control of the company and 
later pressure them to additionally sweeten their bid, there are several combinations to 
consider.  
If a majority of the shareholders have agreed by voting, before or after the bid to not accept a 
takeover in any condition then there is almost no limit on what combinations of defenses you 
could put into practice to make the bidder cancel their offer. Probably the most effective and 
easiest combination would be with a well prepared proactive defense strategy and several 
reactive alternatives in hand. The plan could include a staggered board, poison pills of flip-in 
and flip-over structure, a super-majority amendment and a well-covered parachute plan. All 
these proactive measures are fairly easy to implement to the company stagger and do not take 
more than a shareholders voting to approve them. Regarding the options for reactive 
measurements in the target company’s attempt in defending against a hostile bid, they could 
for instance implement the White Knight defense strategy, conduct litigations in order to gain 
more intelligence about the bid offered and to strongly oppose the rationale of the bid. 
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Commonly, the target company does not exclude the possibility of a merger through a hostile 
bid, but still wants to be relatively prepared if such an event should occur. Regarding the pre-
active measurements, we feel that the implementation of the staggered board defense strategy 
combined with the poison pill flip-in defense structure is preferable in this scenario. And as 
mentioned before this is a good way of hindering the bidder in gaining immediate control over 
the target company. Furthermore, we believe that these options are the most effective and 
easiest to implement, since they only require acceptance at a shareholders meeting and are 
implemented automatically when facing a hostile bid. Regarding the re-active measurements, 
instead of using the white knight defense strategy should adopt the white squire defense 
measurement, which would mean the invitation of a third party, hence pressuring the bidder to 
potentially increase the bid premium. Additionally, one should avoid the majority amendment 
defense measurement, since it can help stagger bids offered to the target company. By 
implementing these defense measurements while avoiding others, the effects would be 
sufficient and effective enough in order for the target company to prolong the bid and receive 
more time to evaluate the bids offered to them.  
 
For future research and development of the subject presented in our thesis, we would like to 
point out some of the aspects we felt could be complementary in addition to those areas we 
already have touched upon in this thesis. Since our collection of data consisted only of 
secondary data, it didn’t allow us to analyze and conclude our findings as deep and broad as if 
we had collected both secondary and primary data, from for example interviews. Furthermore, 
we believe an increase of case illustrations in a thesis of this kind, would have given the 
reader a more graspable understanding of the different defense strategies described in our 
thesis and their practical implications. Lastly, we would like to promote a discussion about the 
defense strategies available exclusively to the shareholders of a targeted firm and what the 
affects and outcome of the different implementations would mean for a single shareholder as 
a contrast to looking at the effects on a company as a whole. 
We never know when or where the next hostile takeover will take place but one thing is 
certain, it will happen again and the efficiency in protecting against it will surely depend on 
how well prepared the target company is. 
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